Three Pathways to European Defence: What the CEPS Report Actually Disagrees About

What the CEPS Report Actually Disagrees About

A new report from four major European think tanks proposes three distinct routes to more Europe in defence. The question worth asking: are these genuinely different strategies, or three versions of the same hope dressed in different institutional clothing?

In Brief: A joint report from CEPS, RUSI, Clingendael, and IEP, chaired by former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, outlines three pathways for European defence integration: a more European NATO, new European multilateralism, and EU-led defence cooperation. The report arrives as US commitment to NATO faces uncertainty and European defence spending accelerates. The real debate isn't which pathway is best but which disagreements each pathway papers over versus which it forces into the open.

The structural questions this report raises deserve more than a summary. They deserve the kind of conversation happening at Human x AI Europe on May 19 in Vienna, where Europe's institutional futures get debated in real time.

The Setup: Why This Report, Why Now

The CEPS report opens with a diagnosis that has become familiar: Russia's war against Ukraine, combined with what it calls destabilising actions by the second Trump administration, has pushed Europe toward an inflection point. The US is reconsidering its NATO posture and may redeploy assets away from Europe. Public support for defence spending has never been higher. Most European political parties agree something must change.

So far, so consensus. The interesting question is what happens next.

The report, produced jointly by CEPS, RUSI, Clingendael, and the Institute for European Politics (IEP), with former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö as Task Force Chair, proposes three pathways. But before examining them, it's worth naming what kind of disagreement this actually is.

Disaggregating the Disagreement

When someone says Europe needs more defence integration, they might mean several different things:

• (a) More coordinated procurement to reduce duplication and waste
• (b) Shared command structures for rapid response
• (c) A European nuclear deterrent or conventional force capable of territorial defence without US involvement
• (d) Industrial policy to build a European defence technology base
• (e) Political integration sufficient to make collective decisions about when and how to use force

These are five different goals with different costs, different timelines, and different political prerequisites. A French strategist might prioritise (c) and (e). A German industrial policy advocate might focus on (a) and (d). A Baltic defence minister might care most about (b). Until the debate disaggregates these positions, participants aren't really arguing; they're performing agreement while meaning different things.

The CEPS report's three pathways represent different bets about which of these goals are achievable and which institutional homes can deliver them.

Pathway One: A More European NATO

The first pathway keeps NATO as the primary framework but shifts the internal balance. European allies would take on greater responsibility within existing structures, potentially including European leadership of NATO's European operations.

This pathway assumes the US remains in NATO but reduces its commitment. It requires Europeans to spend more, coordinate better, and accept that American assets may not always be available. The institutional architecture stays largely intact; the burden-sharing shifts.

The appeal is obvious: it avoids the political costs of building new institutions. The risk is equally obvious: it depends on American willingness to remain engaged enough to provide nuclear deterrence and strategic enablers while stepping back enough to let Europeans lead. That's a narrow band of US behaviour to bet on.

Pathway Two: New European Multilateralism

The second pathway moves outside EU structures to build coalitions of the willing. A related CEPS analysis notes that the search for a coalition of the able and willing currently happens outside the EU's structures so as to include NATO allies like the UK and Turkey.

This pathway acknowledges a political reality: the EU's decision-making rules make rapid defence integration difficult, and some of Europe's most capable military powers (the UK, Turkey, Norway) are not EU members. A new multilateral framework could move faster and include more relevant actors.

The appeal: flexibility and speed. The risk: yet another institutional layer in an already crowded European security architecture, with unclear relationships to NATO, the EU, and bilateral arrangements.

Pathway Three: EU-Led Defence Cooperation

The third pathway doubles down on EU institutions. The European Commission and High Representative have already laid out a roadmap in their White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030. A European Parliament study on European Defence Projects of Common Interest describes flagship initiatives including a Drone Initiative, Eastern Flank Watch, Air Shield, and Space Shield.

This pathway leverages the EU's existing industrial policy tools, procurement coordination mechanisms, and budget. It builds on frameworks like the European Defence Fund (EDF), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD).

The appeal: institutional depth and existing legal frameworks. The risk: the EU's consensus requirements and the gap between industrial policy and actual military capability. As the CEPS analysis notes, the White Paper shied away from issues of organisation, personnel, training, leadership and education.

The Trilemma Nobody Wants to Name

The accompanying CEPS commentary states the uncomfortable truth directly: Europe still appears to be treating this existential security crisis like a regular bureaucratic undertaking that it can address at its leisure.

The deeper problem is what the analysis calls a trilemma. To achieve genuine European strategic autonomy, member states must accept at least one of three costs:

• 1. Substantial impact on other policy areas or tax increases to fund defence
• 2. Ceding sovereignty over parts of national militaries
• 3. Compromising on what weapons systems to buy and from whom

Most European debates about defence integration avoid naming which of these costs countries are actually willing to pay. The three pathways in the CEPS report represent different bets about which costs are politically feasible, but none of them escapes the trilemma.

Where Each Pathway Breaks Down

Pathway One (European NATO) breaks down if the US withdraws more completely than expected, or if European allies cannot agree on burden-sharing within NATO structures.

Pathway Two (New Multilateralism) breaks down if the coalition of the willing cannot agree on decision-making rules, or if it duplicates rather than complements existing institutions.

Pathway Three (EU-Led) breaks down if industrial policy cannot translate into military capability fast enough, or if member states cannot agree on common procurement.

The report's value lies not in recommending one pathway over another but in making these trade-offs visible. The question for European policymakers is not which pathway is best? but which disagreements are we prepared to have, and which are we trying to avoid?

The Question That Changes the Room

If the goal is European defence capability by 2030, as the White Paper suggests, then the relevant question is: what would have to be true for each pathway to succeed?

For Pathway One: the US would need to remain committed enough to provide strategic enablers while stepping back enough to let Europeans lead.

For Pathway Two: a new multilateral framework would need to achieve what existing frameworks have not, without creating additional coordination costs.

For Pathway Three: EU industrial policy would need to translate into deployable military capability faster than it has historically.

Each of these conditions is possible. None is guaranteed. The honest answer is that Europe may need elements of all three pathways, with different countries emphasising different routes based on their strategic cultures and capabilities.

The report's contribution is not to resolve this debate but to structure it. That's worth something. The next step is for European leaders to name which costs they're actually willing to pay.