The Return Regulation: What Kind of Disagreement Is Europe Actually Having?
On 26 March 2026, the European Parliament voted 389 to 206 to advance the proposed Return Regulation – a law that would fundamentally reshape how the EU handles migrants who receive orders to leave. The vote passed with support from the EPP, ECR, Patriots for Europe, and ESN, marking what CEPS analysts describe as "yet another collapse of the von der Leyen majority in the Parliament."
The debate that followed has been predictably polarized. Critics invoke the spectre of America's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Supporters celebrate "the era of deportations." Both sides seem certain they're arguing about the same thing.
They're not.
Disaggregating the Disagreement
Before examining the substance, it's worth naming what kind of disagreement this actually is. The Return Regulation debate contains at least four distinct arguments that keep getting conflated:
A facts disagreement: Does the current system work? The Commission's premise – that only 20% of return orders are enforced – has become the central justification for reform. But as CEPS researchers note, this statistic "hides more than it reveals." Some individuals are counted multiple times across Member States. Return orders are issued in cases where removal was never legally or practically feasible – pending appeals, health conditions, family ties, non-cooperation from countries of origin. The low enforcement rate may reflect legal constraints that no reform can override, not system failure.
A values disagreement: What weight should enforcement receive relative to rights protection? The Migration Policy Group's MIREX index finds that return policies across Europe already score just 46 out of 100 on human rights safeguards. The question isn't whether enforcement matters – it does – but whether the current balance is already tilted too far toward coercion.
An incentives disagreement: Who benefits from the status quo, and who benefits from change? The CEPS analysis surfaces something uncomfortable: employer-tied permits that lapse when jobs end create a structural supply of irregular workers who cannot assert their rights, refuse unsafe conditions, or organize. "The constant threat they'll be deported is an economic feature – not an accident." This reframes irregularity not as a border failure but as a labour market feature.
A definitions disagreement: What does "effective return policy" even mean? For the ECR, effectiveness means "ensuring that those who have no legal right to stay are effectively returned." For critics, effectiveness must include sustainability, rights protection, and addressing root causes. These aren't the same metric.
Until the debate disaggregates these positions, participants aren't really arguing – they're performing positions.
The Strongest Version of Each Argument
The case for the Regulation, stated in its strongest form: A migration system that cannot enforce its own decisions loses legitimacy. When only one in five return orders results in actual return, the system signals that rules don't apply. This undermines public trust, empowers smugglers who can promise that deportation is unlikely, and creates unfairness toward those who follow legal pathways. The new framework introduces harmonised procedures, a European return order with mutual recognition across Member States, and tools to prevent absconding. Without enforcement capacity, any migration policy is just words.
The case against, stated in its strongest form: Europe is adopting the American enforcement playbook precisely as that playbook's costs become visible. CEPS notes that ICE deployments "have cost cities millions, stretched police departments thin and driven people away from medical care, food programmes and schools – harm that could take years to reverse." The Regulation expands detention (including for children), enables return to countries migrants have no connection with, and – in the Council's version – pushes for home raids. It addresses symptoms while ignoring how European rules themselves produce irregularity through permit structures, income thresholds, and family breakdown provisions.
Both arguments contain truth. The question is which truth is more urgent.
What the Regulation Actually Does
The specifics matter more than the rhetoric. According to the European Parliament's press release, the adopted position includes:
- Detention up to 24 months for those who don't cooperate, present absconding risk, or pose security concerns
- Detention of unaccompanied minors and families with children "as a measure of last resort"
- Return hubs in third countries based on agreements with the EU or individual Member States (though unaccompanied minors may not be transferred this way)
- Entry bans that can be permanent for those deemed security risks
- Mutual recognition of return decisions across the Schengen area by July 2027
- Deletion of provisions requiring Member States to detect undocumented people inside their territory (though the Council's general approach reportedly pushes for home raids)
The Parliament deleted the Commission's original detection provisions. The Council wants them back. Trilogue negotiations will determine where this lands.
The ICE Comparison: Fair or Inflammatory?
The "ICE-ification" framing is doing a lot of work in this debate. Is it fair?
The comparison has substance: expanded interior enforcement, extended detention, cooperation with third countries for removal, penalties for non-compliance. These are structural similarities, not rhetorical flourishes.
But the comparison also obscures differences: the EU framework includes judicial oversight requirements, independent monitoring mechanisms, and explicit (if contested) fundamental rights provisions that the American system lacks. Whether these safeguards survive implementation is an empirical question, not a foregone conclusion.
The more interesting question: why is Europe adopting this approach now, when the American version is generating visible backlash? CEPS references the murders of Renee Nicole Good and Alex Pretti in Minneapolis in January 2026, alongside 32 other deaths at ICE's hands in 2025. Some European political groups condemned ICE operations during the Milan-Cortina Olympics. Days later, the same Parliament passed this Regulation.
The timing suggests that for the current majority, American enforcement failures are not a warning but an acceptable cost.
The Question Worth Asking
The 20% return rate has become the debate's central fact. But what if it's the wrong metric?
If return orders are issued in cases where removal was never feasible, the low rate reflects legal reality, not system failure. If irregularity is produced by European permit structures, enforcement addresses symptoms while leaving causes intact. If the goal is reducing irregular presence, regularisation pathways might be more effective than expanded detention.
None of this means enforcement doesn't matter. It does. But the question worth asking is: What would a return system look like that was both effective and sustainable?
The current debate offers two answers: more coercion or more rights. But these aren't the only options. A third approach would address how irregularity is produced in the first place – through permit structures, income thresholds, and employer-tied visas that convert migration control into labour discipline.
That conversation isn't happening in the trilogue negotiations. Perhaps it should be.
What Comes Next
The Parliament's position now moves to trilogue negotiations with the Council and Commission. The Council's general approach goes further than the Parliament's – including provisions for home raids that the Parliament deleted. The final text will emerge from these negotiations, likely within months.
For those watching European governance, this vote reveals something beyond migration policy: a stable right-wing majority willing to cooperate across traditional boundaries, a centre-left unable to hold its coalition together, and a Commission that launched this process without an impact assessment.
The question of what kind of Europe this produces remains open. But the direction of travel is clear.
These are exactly the tensions – between enforcement and rights, between sovereignty and values, between what's politically viable and what's actually effective – that require better conversations than the current debate allows. Human x AI Europe in Vienna on May 19 is convening founders, policymakers, and governance scholars to work through questions like these. The disagreements won't disappear, but they might become more useful.
Frequently Asked Questions
Q: What is the EU Return Regulation?
A: The Return Regulation is proposed EU legislation to reform how Member States handle migrants who receive orders to leave. It replaces the 2008 Return Directive and introduces harmonised procedures, a European return order with mutual recognition across Schengen, detention provisions up to 24 months, and the possibility of "return hubs" in third countries.
Q: What are return hubs in the EU migration context?
A: Return hubs are facilities in third countries where EU Member States can send migrants whose asylum claims have been rejected or who are found to be staying illegally. These would operate based on bilateral agreements between individual Member States (or the EU) and third countries, even if the migrant has no connection to that country.
Q: Why do critics compare the Return Regulation to ICE?
A: Critics draw parallels to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement because both systems emphasize interior enforcement, extended detention, third-country cooperation for removal, and penalties for non-compliance. CEPS analysts argue Europe is adopting the American enforcement playbook as its costs become visible in the US.
Q: What does the 20% return rate statistic actually mean?
A: The Commission claims only 20% of migrants who receive return orders are actually removed from EU territory. However, researchers note this figure may be misleading – some individuals are counted multiple times across Member States, and many return orders are issued in cases where removal was never legally or practically feasible.
Q: When will the Return Regulation become law?
A: The Parliament's position must now go through trilogue negotiations with the Council and Commission. Given the similarity between Parliament and Council positions, negotiations are expected to conclude within approximately two months. Mutual recognition of return decisions across Schengen would apply by 1 July 2027.
Q: Can children be detained under the new Return Regulation?
A: Yes. The adopted position allows detention of unaccompanied minors and families with children "as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period," taking into account the best interests of the child. However, unaccompanied minors may not be transferred to return hubs in third countries.